The ECJ held that the Directive must be interpreted in a way that the prohibition of direct discrimination is not limited to the disabled persons themselves. It must be interpreted as prohibiting direct discrimination on grounds of disability with respect to an employee who is themself disabled. The principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of direct discrimination applies equally to an employee who is not themself disabled but who, as in the present case, is treated less favourably by reason of the disability of their child, for whom they are the primary provider of the care required by virtue of the child’s condition.

Opinion of the advocate general:

The advocate general Maduro further pointed out in the Opinion that the prohibition of associated discrimination is not limited to cases of disability, but also on grounds of age, religion and sexual orientation: “The Directive operates at the level of grounds of discrimination. The wrong that it was intended to remedy is the use of certain characteristics as grounds to treat some employees less well than others; what it does is to remove religion, age, disability and sexual orientation completely from the range of grounds an employer may legitimately use to treat some people less well.”

Judgment:

The court argues that the Directive should grant a full protection against discrimination and thus, applies not only to a particular category of person, but by reference to the grounds mentioned in Article 1 of the Directive 2000/78 to associated third people as well. Associated Discrimination would undermine the dignity and self-determination of persons belonging to a particular category of person, even if they are not discriminated themselves, but discrimination against people who are not in such a category themselves, due to their close connection to a person in such a category occurs. According to the concept of egality, the norms should also prohibit the more subtle forms of discrimination, as these forms have an impact on the explicitly protected persons as well.

Regarding harassment, the court takes the same considerations and holds that the norms of the directive are not limited to persons who are disabled themselves. If an employee who has been in a comparable situation to Ms Coleman, can prove that they were harassed, this harassment would be illegal under the directive.

Regarding the interpretation of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the British court declared, that Ms Coleman had to make a prima facie case (plausibly assert) that the discrimination in the workplace was due to her child's disability. The appeal of the employer was denied and in April 2010 Ms Coleman was awarded 12 000 pound in an out-of-court settlement and by severance payment.

However, the question on how close the connection between the person in a protected category and the victim of the discrimination must be, has remained open.